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1. Introduction1
Thus far, scientific knowledge has destroyed existing cul-
tural meanings without creating any new ones. At best, it has pro-
vided material for creating new meanings.2 Max Weber described 
this cultural nihilism concerning meaning—albeit not in this 
terminology—as part of  a culture- and epoch-transcending pro-
cess of  rationalization whose results he called “disenchantment” 
(Entzauberung), a term which since then has become emblematic 
of  modernity.3 I concur with Weber’s pointed characterization of  
1 I would like to thank Dr. Ciaran Cronin for his excellent translation of  
the German original and an anonymous reviewer for criticisms and suggestions 
for improving the text, which I gladly followed.
2 The concept of  meaning refers to different object domains. Moti-
vational practical meaning, for instance, or meaning as intentional semantic 
understanding can be distinguished from cultural meaning. Jürgen Habermas’s 
idea of  an emancipatory science that contributes to overcoming coercive social 
relations through reflection on its own epistemic conditions is an example of  a 
position that rejects the thesis that science necessarily leads to the destruction 
of  cultural meaning. See Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Bos-
ton: Polity Press, 1972). Among those who argue that science destroys meaning 
is Ray Brassier, who describes this process as “the most far-reaching (and still 
ongoing) intellectual revolution of  the past two thousand years”: Ray Brassier, 
Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2007), xi.
3 Weber makes a connection between disenchantment and the destruc-
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cultural meanings as magic. Cultural meaning, whose distinguish-
ing feature is its normative contents, traditionally assumes the form 
of  magic and religion, as well as of  unifying world interpretations 
that are not necessarily religious in character. Weber uses the term 
“enchantment” or “magic” (Zauber) in its narrow sense to refer to 
the recognition of  not rationally demonstrated assertions and non-
sensually experienceable entities that nevertheless have practical 
relevance.4 However, the historical success of  the concept of  disen-
chantment can be traced back to the broad meaning of  “enchant-
ment” or “magic”, by which is meant a quasi-magical attractive 
force or a mysterious radiance that lends things a distinctive allure. 
Disenchantment then means that the world of  appearance loses its 
fascination and unquestionable relevance for human beings.
Disenchantment is not a product of  science alone, but 
arises from a social process of  the imposition of  rational orders 
that also initially includes certain forms of  religion. Its result is 
the differentiation and autonomization of  distinct sub-domains of  
society and culture. Under conditions of  advanced rationalization, 
however, science plays the leading role in the ongoing process of  
disenchantment. 
It is true that the period of  the effective cultural dominance 
of  magical ideas lies far in the past and that religion now enjoys 
limited public influence in the majority of  industrialized societies. 
However, spiritual beliefs still play a role in modern societies as 
elements of  patterns of  orientation and forms of  identification.5 
verstehenden Soziologie, ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: Mohr, 1972), 308 
and Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Vol. I (Tubingen: J. C. 
B. Mohr, 1922), 563. However, some authors have claimed that disenchant-
ment leads, not to the destruction, but to the creation of  meaning: Johannes 
Winckelmann, “Die Herkunft von Max Webers ‘Entzauberungs’-Konzeption”, 
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 32, no.1 (March 1980), and 
Manfred Frank, Conditio moderna: Essays, Reden, Programm (Leipzig: Reclam, 
1993).
4 Max Weber, The Religion of  India: The Sociology of  Hinduism and Bud-
dhism, trans. and ed. Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale (Glencoe, IL: Free 
Press, 1958), 336.
5 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
2007), 505–538.
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Sometimes their influence is even claimed to be on the rise again 
and there is talk of  a re-enchantment of  the world.6 But spiritual 
beliefs are also subject to the process of  differentiation and autono-
mization. 
As controversial as the cultural relevance of  disenchant-
ment may be, there can be no doubt about the prominent role that 
science plays in this process. There is no place for the constitutive 
components of  cultural meanings in scientific knowledge.7 Scien-
tific knowledge – it will be assumed here – is distinguished by syste-
maticity, intersubjectivity and verifiability in accordance with strict 
rules.8 It has an objective character, by which is meant not only 
the independence of  knowledge from individual factors such as 
the attitudes, opinions, or convictions of  individual persons. Ob-
jectivity also denotes a property of  the description of  facts that on 
account of  their epoch- and culture-transcending character escape 
the control of  human action, without thereby being historically 
unchangeable. Scientific knowledge is permeating more and more 
domains of  human reality and is increasingly closely interwoven 
with technical applications that are indispensable for the organiza-
tion of  human life. 
However, it would be insufficient to describe the cultural 
nihilism concerning meaning at work here solely in terms of  the 
negatively connoted concept of  disenchantment. The fact that un-
til now science has merely destroyed existing cultural meanings, 
without producing any new ones, must be attributed to additional 
6 Serge Moscovici, “Die Wiederverzauberung der Welt”, in Jenseits der 
Krise: Wider das politische Defizit der Ökologie, ed. Alain Touraine et al. (Frank-
furt am Main: Syndikat, 1976), Frank, Conditio moderna, and Richard Jenkins, 
“Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment: Max Weber at the 
Millennium”, Max Weber Studies 1, no. 1 (2000), http://www.jstor.org/sta-
ble/24579711.
7 The thesis that cultural meanings influence scientific knowledge is 
only upheld by marginal positions in the philosophy of  science, such as the so-
called Strong Program in the sociology of  knowledge.
8 This characterization of  scientific knowledge implies neither that it is 
value-free nor that it is context-independent. On the value-laden character of  
scientific knowledge, see section 3 of  the present paper; on its context-depen-
dent character, see footnote 11.
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positive features of  scientific knowledge.9 Science itself  is subject 
to differentiation and autonomy, which is reflected in the special-
ization of  its disciplines and restricts the validity of  the knowledge 
produced by the respective disciplines to selected areas of  reality. 
Characteristic of  scientific knowledge are certain ways of  explain-
ing objects in the material world and of  understanding objects 
with meanings.10 A phenomenon has been scientifically explained 
or understood when it has been described in a reproducible way 
and its conditions of  occurrence and dynamics of  development 
have been comprehended and placed in a theoretical context. In 
short, scientific knowledge has reached its goal regarding an object 
when no factor is missing that is required to rationally reconstruct 
the knowledge and the changes it undergoes. This does not require 
the kind of  normative evaluation provided by cultural meaning. 
However, practical contexts determine the more detailed condi-
tions for fulfilling the relevant criteria of  scientific explanation and 
understanding, which also undergo historical change.11
Despite this variability, one can specify context-indepen-
dent paradigmatic examples of  successful processes of  scientific 
cognition. A disease has been scientifically explained when it has 
been adequately defined by specifying its characteristics, when the 
conditions under which it occurs and the course it takes have been 
clarified in line with other relevant knowledge, and when as a re-
sult the treatment options have as a general rule also been speci-
fied. The flow of  a liquid counts as having been explained when it 
has been characterized in terms of  physical variables that can be 
related to those of  other theories and when its initial and boundary 
conditions, as well as the mathematical relationships in terms of  
which it can be described, are known. A meaning is deemed to be 
9 I discuss the future possible conditions of  the production of  cultural 
meaning by the sciences in section 5.
10 On the distinction between explanation and understanding in the 
philosophy of  science, see Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Systematicity: The Nature of  
Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 53–56.
11 On the context-dependence of  knowledge, see Michael Williams, 
Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of  Scepticism (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996).
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understood when it exists in the form of  a reproducible utterance 
and the context in which it occurs and the relevancies of  its pos-
sible interpretation have been determined. 
In general, it can be assumed that the scientific explanation 
and understanding of  phenomena is a process that can be con-
cluded approximately or completely, if  one considers the develop-
ment of  scientific knowledge over an extended period of  time. In 
modern times, it has been conjectured, contrary to the claim that 
the progress of  knowledge is unlimited, that scientific knowledge 
of  individual domains of  phenomena, and perhaps even the scien-
tific enterprise as a whole, can be brought to a conclusion.12 In my 
view, Werner Heisenberg’s conception of  closed theories provides 
a model for how scientific knowledge as a whole unfolds. Accord-
ing to Heisenberg’s conception, this process can arrive at an overall 
comprehension of  reality that is no longer regarded as susceptible 
of  significant improvement. Once it has been concluded, scientific 
knowledge leaves behind a transparency that is scarcely in need of  
supplementation.13 
I call the cognitive state achieved through scientific expla-
nation or understanding “epistemic transparency of  the scienc-
es” or “scientific-epistemic transparency.” This expression stands 
in the tradition of  the classical justification of  science, according 
to which scientific knowledge transforms the unknown into the 
known. The known—as that which is taken-for-granted—is, as 
it were, transparent because it does not require special attention. 
“Transparency” takes up the metaphor of  light, according to which 
science removes the darkness that stands in the way of  knowledge. 
12 Nietzsche already thought that in the sciences “everything essential 
has been discovered and only a pitiful late remainder is left for the seeker to 
cull.” Then science would no longer stand “in stark contrast to grey and te-
dious error.” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, 
trans. R. J. Hollingdale [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], 121). 
In section 5 below I discuss arguments concerning the finiteness of  scientific 
progress.
13 On Werner Heisenberg’s conception of  closed theories, which is tai-
lored to physical disciplines, see Gregor Schiemann, Werner Heisenberg (Munich: 
C.H.Beck, 2008), 70 ff. and 116 f.
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With the removal of  epistemic opacity it becomes more difficult 
for magical and religious belief  systems to compete with scientific 
knowledge. Currently, the differentiation and autonomization of  
the sciences ensure that rationally understood objects remain so 
specialized that they cannot serve as a basis for a comprehensive 
foundation of  meaning.
Epistemic transparency does not only assume a scientific 
form. For example, explanations and processes of  understanding 
that lack the conditions of  reproducibility and integration into a 
theoretical context can give rise to a cognitive condition of  trans-
parency that does not satisfy the criteria of  scientific objectivity. 
Transparency exists at an everyday practical level when the condi-
tions for the occurrence and change of  phenomena are known. 
I conceive of  epistemic transparency as a precondition of  public 
transparency, where by the latter is meant the general accessibil-
ity of  information, that is, of  data and knowledge. “Accessibility” 
includes not only the possibility of  obtaining information, but also 
the requirement on social actors to disclose the information that 
underlies their actions. Someone who has information is generally 
also in a cognitive state that allows her to explain or understand 
the objects of  her knowledge. Non-scientific epistemic transpar-
ency, conversely, will not be public when its lack of  objectivity pre-
vents it from being generally accessible. Scientific-epistemic trans-
parency, on the other hand, is public at least insofar as anyone can 
in principle acquire the knowledge that makes it possible.
The concept of  scientific-epistemic transparency can in-
corporate essential features of  disenchantment. Like disenchant-
ment, transparency is incompatible with magic, miracles and se-
cret knowledge. It aims at a rational comprehension of  the world 
as a prerequisite for shaping reality in purposeful ways and it has 
no need of  any culturally endowed meaning. Scientific-epistemic 
transparency can be understood as the dominant modern form of  
disenchantment.
The social dimension of  disenchantment and scientific-
epistemic transparency can be discussed using the example of  the 
lifeworld. According to Weber, the process of  rationalization does 
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not come to a halt before the lifeworld. Although for Weber the 
special characteristic of  “value freedom” (Wertfreiheit) sets scientific 
knowledge apart from other forms of  knowledge, he does not make 
a clear separation between scientific and everyday knowledge. This 
lack of  differentiation can be traced back in part to the elements of  
Weber’s conception of  modernity that are grounded in a critique 
of  culture.14 In order to demarcate the lifeworld as a non-scientific 
field of  experience I draw upon the social phenomenology of  Al-
fred Schütz.15 In contrast to the nonintuitive, questioning charac-
ter of  scientific knowledge, lifeworld knowledge is distinguished by 
the immediacy of  its contents and the taken-for-grantedness with 
which it understands its objects. In modernity, the lifeworld is not 
so much a source of  disenchantment and epistemic transparency; 
instead it finds itself  confronted with these forms of  meaning-de-
stroying conceptions of  the world. Speaking with Husserl, science 
“excludes in principle precisely the questions which man, given 
over in our unhappy times to the most portentous upheavals, finds 
the most burning: questions of  the meaning or meaninglessness of  
the whole of  this human existence.”16
In what follows, I will develop further the argument that 
today scientific-epistemic transparency is the primary source of  
disenchantment. In order to understand epistemic transparency 
as a scientific form of  disenchantment, Weber’s concept must be 
subjected to critique. On the one hand, Weber extends the con-
cept of  disenchantment in an inadmissible way when he fails to 
14 Weber’s conception of  modernity contains not only elements of  a 
critique of  culture, but also universalistic elements. On this, see Habermas, 
The Theory of  Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984, 1987), Vol. I, 178–185.
15 For a more detailed account of  the features of  the lifeworld, see 
Gregor Schiemann “One Cognitive Style Among Others: Towards a Phenom-
enology of  the Lifeworld and of  Other Experiences”, in The Multidimensionality 
of  Hermeneutic Phenomenology, eds. Babette Babich and Dimitri Ginev (Dor-
drecht: Springer, 2013), 31–48, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01707-
5_3.
16 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of  European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology: An Introduction of  Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 6.
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separate it clearly from lifeworld knowledge. However, from his 
concept one can glean elements that can serve as pointers for a 
concept of  the lifeworld different from science (2). On the other 
hand, Weber restricts disenchantment when he claims that scien-
tific knowledge is not able to grasp value-formation and decision-
making processes. In order to understand epistemic transparency 
as a scientific form of  disenchantment, the latter must be defined 
differently from Weber (3). The concept of  transparency defended 
here must be demarcated in contemporary discourse from other 
conceptions that place too narrow limits on the objectivity of  sci-
entific-epistemic transparency or reject it entirely (4). Regarding 
the epistemic transparency of  the sciences, I assume that it is not 
self-limiting, that is, that it proceeds from the scientistic notion that 
all phenomena in the world of  experience can be understood. If  
a comprehensive scientific theory of  the world existed, it might 
also be able to found culturally sustainable dimensions of  meaning 
(5). In contrast to epistemic transparency, limits must be placed 
on public transparency, because releasing information might be 
neither politically, nor legally nor morally justifiable (6). Finally, the 
paper will give an overview of  the main conclusions (7).
2. Transparency as scientific disenchantment
Pointers to a close relationship between disenchantment 
and transparency can already be found in Weber’s account of  
the history of  the process of  disenchantment. This can be recon-
structed as a three-stage sequence comprising the establishment 
of  “mythological-magical modes of  thought,” the beginning of  its 
religious-scientific disenchantment and the subsequent exclusively 
scientific disenchantment to which religion falls prey as irrational 
belief.17 
Weber correctly locates the beginning of  religious and sci-
entific disenchantment in the ancient world and points to the role 
17 Wolfgang Schluchter, Die Entzauberung der Welt: Sechs Studien zu Max 
Weber (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 3 ff.
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played by “Hellenic scientific thought.”18 The example of  Aristo-
tle’s formative influence on subsequent ancient thought provides 
evidence of  the unity of  disenchantment and epistemic transpar-
ency in the justification of  classical science, which remains influen-
tial to the present day. Aristotle describes scientific knowledge as a 
path “from that which is more familiar to us but more unfamiliar 
by nature, to that which is more familiar and clearer by nature but 
is unknown to us.”19 Human beings acquire knowledge by explain-
ing what is unknown to them in terms of  what they already know, 
that is, by creating transparency.20 At the same time, the Aristo-
telian conception of  science represents an important step in the 
disenchantment of  the understanding of  the world. Whereas in 
earlier philosophy (e.g. Plato’s) the world existed only in virtue of  
its direct participation in the divine ideas, in Aristotle it owes noth-
ing to the divine except its infinitely distant first cause, a part of  the 
rational soul and the infinitely distant goal of  all movement.
Weber mistakenly believes that religious and scientific dis-
enchantment finds “its logical conclusion” in ascetic Protestant-
ism.21 As already noted, the continuing and perhaps even resur-
gent influence of  spiritual beliefs indicates that the critique of  
mythological-magical modes of  thought has not yet—and possibly 
cannot—come to an end. Ascetic Protestantism may therefore be 
seen, not as the conclusion, but as the climax of  a special historical 
episode of  these modes of  thought. This episode was directed at 
the “rationalization of  individual life,” and hence also of  the space 
18 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  Capitalism, trans. Talcott 
Parsons (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 61.
19 Wolfgang Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik: Untersuchungen über die Grund-
legung der Naturwissenschaft und die sprachlichen Bedingungen der Prinzipienforschung bei 
Aristoteles (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1962), 70.
20 Aristotle was not yet aware of  any extension of  the scope of  already 
familiar knowledge, as presupposed by the concept of  transparency introduced 
here.
21 Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  Capitalism, 61. Under the 
heading of  ascetic Protestantism, Weber includes, among others, Calvinists, 
Puritans, Pietists, Methodists, Anabaptists, Baptists, Mennonites and Quakers. 
See Schluchter, Die Entzauberung der Welt, 8.
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of  experience of  the lifeworld.22 Mythological-magical ideas were 
systematically banned from everyday practice in the Protestant in-
terest in one’s own salvation, which can only be achieved as an 
obedient tool of  God. In Weber, therefore, the lifeworld appears 
alongside science as the basis of  disenchantment. In fact, he as-
sumes that disenchantment at the social level progresses to the ex-
tent that individuals also orient their actions rationally in everyday 
practice.23 However, the rationalization of  the lifeworld also has 
limits for Weber. The more comprehensive social rationalization 
becomes, the weaker it becomes at the level of  everyday practice 
from which it proceeded. In everyday life, according to Weber, the 
institutionalization of  rational orders leads to the prevalence of  
“consensual conformity to what is habitual, what is familiar, what 
one is brought up to do, what constantly recurs ... that type of  
behavior ... of  more or less approximately uniform mass action 
without any meaning-relatedness.”24 
Weber’s assertion that the lifeworld keeps its distance from 
rationalization, for which there is textual evidence, is problematic 
insofar as he attaches a negative evaluation to this distance-taking. 
He does not accord it any independent status, but bases it instead 
on unreflected adaptation to the unquestioningly accepted ratio-
nalization processes described as conformity or submissiveness 
(Fügsamkeit). 
The lack of  a clear determination of  the relationship be-
tween lifeworld experience and scientific knowledge is also a fea-
ture of  what is probably Weber’s most well-known definition of  
disenchantment under conditions of  advanced scientific domina-
tion:
Rationalization does not mean a general increase in our knowl-
22 Weber, Religionssoziologie I, 163 ff. and Weber, “Religious Rejections of  
the World and Their Directions”, in Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1946), 338–339. Weber does not use the expression ‘lifeworld’ here.
23 Max Weber, Collected Methodological Writings, ed. Hans Henrich Brunn 
and Sam Whimster (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 289.
24 Ibid., 300.
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edge of  the conditions under which we live our lives. Rather, it 
means something else: the knowledge, or the belief, that if  we 
wished to, we could at any time learn about the conditions of  our 
life; in other words: that, in principle, no mysterious and unpre-
dictable forces play a role in that respect, but that, on the con-
trary, we can—in principle—dominate everything by means of  
calculation. And that, in its turn, means that the world has become 
disenchanted. Unlike the savage, for whom those forces existed, 
we no longer need to resort to magical means in order to domi-
nate or solicit the spirits. This can be done by technical means 
and calculation. This, above all, is the meaning of  intellectualiza-
tion as such.25
Disenchantment on this definition is narrower in scope 
than scientific-epistemic transparency, because it is skewed in a 
one-sided way to calculability, which is not necessarily the goal of  
explanations and processes of  understanding. In spite of  this nar-
rowness, the definition nevertheless remains vague in two respects. 
On the one hand, “knowledge of  the conditions under which we 
live” is not assumed to be actually given, but instead to be possible. 
On the other hand, the notion applies as much to knowledge of  
this possibility as to mere belief  in it. In this context, knowledge 
and belief  denote two potentially contradictory alternatives. The 
knowledge of  being able at any time to learn about “a general 
increase in our knowledge of  the conditions under which we live” 
presupposes that the conditions for this knowledge have already 
been fully clarified. Belief, on the other hand, can be more or less 
justified.
Taken together, these two ambiguities permit different in-
terpretations of  Weber’s definition. Disenchantment could be a 
matter of  an insufficiently grounded conviction, such as occurs in 
non-scientific contexts, the lifeworld included, when the compe-
tence to judge the state of  scientific knowledge of  an object domain 
is lacking. Since Weber adopts a critical stance toward science,26 
25 Ibid., 342 (translation amended; emphasis in original).
26 Ibid., 343: “The theoretical constructions of  science are an unreal 
world where artificial abstractions try to grasp the lifeblood and sap of  real life 
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however, he might also want to express the idea that scientifically 
demonstrated disenchantment does not necessarily have any real 
content. It would be a misconception, not of  laypersons, but of  
experts who overestimated the scope of  their science. Finally, how-
ever, Weber’s definition of  disenchantment can also be understood 
to mean that the extent of  scientific knowledge achieved thus far 
justifies the general assumption that no experienceable object is in 
principle beyond its reach.
In the latter interpretation, the difference between knowl-
edge and belief  is minimized and disenchantment and transpar-
ency in part coincide. The belief  in possible disenchantment is suf-
ficiently well-founded that it approaches the status of  knowledge 
as a true warranted conviction, whereby the justification can differ 
according to context. Scientifically speaking, it can rely on previ-
ous experience of  the application of  a scientific method (“techni-
cal means and calculation”), whereas from the perspective of  the 
lifeworld it can appeal to experience of  the application of  scien-
tific knowledge. For science, which forbids knowledge that refers 
to mysterious forces, disenchantment and transparency coincide. 
That is not necessarily true of  the lifeworld. There, on the one 
hand, forces that as yet cannot be rationally explained can still be 
considered effective, alongside the scientific knowledge for good 
reasons exist. On the other hand, the lifeworld can also be drawn 
into processes of  disenchantment through the rationalization of  its 
action, independently of  its stance on scientific explanations and 
processes of  understanding.
Weber’s concept of  disenchantment thus enables us to dif-
ferentiate between science and the lifeworld in a way that is re-
quired to apply context-specific meanings of  the concept of  epis-
temic transparency as forms of  disenchantment. Furthermore, the 
discussion of  Weber’s definition of  disenchantment has alluded to 
the fact that it should not only be understood as calculating knowl-
edge if  it is to count as a form of  transparency.
with their wizened hands, but never succeed in catching hold of  them” (trans-
lation amended).
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3. The scope of  epistemic transparency
A further enlargement of  the scope of  the concept of  dis-
enchantment, without which it cannot cohere with the leading role 
of  science in the process of  disenchantment, concerns the inclusion 
of  values and norms. With the requirement of  “value freedom” he 
places on science, Weber asserts that a distinguishing feature of  sci-
entific knowledge by comparison with other modes of  knowledge 
is that its assertions do not depend on values and do not have any 
norm-setting power. Although science can make values objects of  
its investigation, he argues, it cannot establish values itself.27 Ac-
cording to Weber, values are results of  individual achievements 
and objects of  private decisions. Although both norms and values 
are capable of  intellectual and rational elaboration, they cannot be 
fully justified.28 The fact that as a result values may not be included 
in scientific findings is already sufficient for a transparency require-
ment implicitly presupposed by Weber, which values cannot satisfy 
because of  their opacity. Conversely, values as objects of  scientific 
knowledge cannot be threatened in their subjectivity. The strict 
separation between objective science and subjective evaluation can 
be traced back to Weber’s neo-Kantian background.29 For him, 
one characteristic of  disenchantment is precisely the freedom of  
scientific knowledge from values and thus from meaning.30
27 Max Weber, “The ‘Objectivity’ of  Knowledge in Social Science and 
Social Policy”, in Weber, Collected Methodological Writings, 100–138. In what fol-
lows, by values I understand judgments about the goodness of  states, and by 
norms principles of  action that aim to realize a certain behavior. Values differ 
from norms in having a more indirect reference to human action. Since norms 
presuppose values, the properties of  the latter also apply to the former.
28 On the subjectivity of  the formation and positing of  values, see Max 
Weber, “The Nation State and Economic Policy”, in Weber, Political Writings, 
eds. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 18–19; as well as Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 242; and We-
ber, Religionssoziologie I, 537.
29 Habermas, Theory of  Communicative Action, Vol. I: Reason and the Ratio-
nalisation of  Society (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), 186.
30 For Weber, values are a prerequisite for the creation of  meaning; see 
Hans-Peter Müller, “Rationalität, Rationalisierung, Rationalismus”, in Max 
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Against Weber it must be objected that objectivity and 
subjectivity are not uniformly distinguishable.31 Although the re-
producibility of  scientific knowledge calls for independence from 
individual subjectivity, there can be no doubt about the objectively 
existing close interrelationship between scientific knowledge and 
values. Epistemic, ethical and social values enter into the process 
of  scientific cognition, which in turn influences and in part also 
triggers the formation and change of  these different types of  val-
ues.32 Processes of  value formation and change are not exclusively 
the subject matter of  the humanities, but increasingly also of  em-
pirical disciplines such as psychology, research on evolution, an-
thropology and neuroscience. These types of  empirical research 
systematically adhere to a scientistic program according to which 
the world of  experience, including mental and cultural phenom-
ena, can be scientifically described, explained or understood, and 
changed.
The naturalistic variants of  this program strive to overcome 
the object-subject split by trying to grasp all phenomena as natu-
ral phenomena. Reductive naturalism attempts to reduce semantic 
phenomena to material processes and trace processes of  under-
standing back to explicable physio-chemical mechanisms. Weber’s 
concept of  explanation lends support to reductive naturalism 
through its restriction to causal explanations, which he regards as 
Weber-Handbuch: Leben—Werk—Wirkung, eds. Hans-Peter Müller and Steffen 
Sigmund (Stuttgart and Weimar: Metzler, 2014), 102; and Karl Löwith, “Die 
Entzauberung der Welt durch Wissenschaft. Zu Max Webers 100. Geburt-
stag,” Merkur 18.196 (1964), https://volltext.merkurzeitschrift.de/journal/
mr_1964_06.
31 That subjectivity and objectivity—or, similarly, values and facts—
cannot be distinguished in a uniform way is a widely held view in contempo-
rary philosophy of  science. Relevant discussions are: Richard Rudner, “The 
scientist qua scientist makes value judgments,” Philosophy of  Science 20.1 (1953): 
1-6, Helen E. Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific 
Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), Hilary Putnam, The Col-
lapse of  the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (Cambridge/London: Harvard 
University Press, 2002).
32 A relevant introduction to the relationship between science and value 
is provided by Martin Carrier, Wissenschaftstheorie zur Einführung (Hamburg: 
Junius, 2006).
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the epitome of  the destruction of  meaning:
The tension between religion and intellectual knowledge defi-
nitely comes to the fore wherever rational, empirical knowledge 
has consistently worked through to the disenchantment of  the 
world and its transformation into a causal mechanism. For then 
science encounters the claims of  the ethical postulate that the 
world is a ... somehow meaningfully and ethically oriented cosmos. 
In principle, the empirical as well as the mathematically oriented 
view of  the world develops refutations of  every intellectual ap-
proach which in any way asks for a ‘meaning’ of  inter-worldly 
occurrences.33
With the phrase “meaningfully and ethically oriented cos-
mos,” Weber is referring to values and norms. It expressed the 
idea that the world is worth preserving and is part of  a natural 
order which prescribes norms to action. Science, according to this 
conception, is not only independent of  values, but also rejects their 
thematization. It creates a world without meaning. 
In order to understand epistemic transparency as a scien-
tific form of  disenchantment, we must reject the postulate of  value 
freedom as formulated by Weber. The production of  epistemic 
transparency also includes values and exerts effects on scientific 
knowledge itself  insofar as it depends on values.
4. The objectivity of  transparency – The relationship to 
other ways of  understanding transparency
The foregoing reflections have shown that, while Weber’s 
concept of  disenchantment and the concept of  transparency ex-
33 Weber, “Religious Rejections of  the World and Their Directions”, 
350–351. The expression “causal mechanism”, which Weber uses to charac-
terize the scientific comprehension of  the world, has preserved its outstanding 
importance in the philosophy of  science to the present day, as is shown by the 
growing influence of  the New Mechanism. See Stuart Glennan and Phyllis Il-
lari, eds., The Routledge Handbook of  Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy (Abing-
don and New York: Routledge, 2017).
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hibit differences, they overlap, or can be brought to overlap, in 
their meanings. Like disenchantment, transparency leaves no 
room for magic, miracles or secret knowledge and disenchantment 
can generate transparency. Thus far, disenchantment and trans-
parency have destroyed existing cultural meanings without replac-
ing them with anything. In order to analytically grasp the leading 
role of  science in this process, I have introduced the concept of  
scientific-epistemic transparency, which, with its positive feature of  
being the result of  explanations actually undertaken or of  process-
es of  understanding actually carried out, is more clearly marked 
off from non-scientific knowledge than disenchantment. Moreover, 
the potential scope of  this knowledge is larger than that of  poten-
tial disenchantment knowledge, if  the latter is restricted to calcu-
lating knowledge and is tied to the postulate of  value freedom.
Epistemically transparent scientific explanations and pro-
cesses of  understanding are rich in theoretical presuppositions; 
they exist in specialized form and, in spite of  these peculiarities, 
are generally verifiable and capable of  being learned. They satisfy 
criteria of  objectivity according to which the truth is independent 
of  personal factors such as individual attitudes, opinions and con-
victions. In this respect, the meaning of  transparency introduced 
here can be rendered more precise by distinguishing it from other 
modes of  understanding. I will confine myself  to two influential 
types of  transparency discourse that are also relevant for under-
standing disenchantment. On the one hand, there is the ideal of  
pure subjective knowledge, as this was given paradigmatic expres-
sion by René Descartes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, two authors 
whose ideas still shape large parts of  the philosophical discourse.34 
The restriction of  transparency to subjectivity limits the possibili-
ties of  understanding it in objective terms (4.1). On the other hand, 
the objectivity of  transparency as such has also been disputed. 
34 Two still influential monographs on the topic of  transparency in 
Rousseau and Descartes respectively are: Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau, Transparency and Obstruction, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: Univer-
sity of  Chicago Press, 1988) and Bernhard Williams, Descartes: The Project of  
Pure Enquiry (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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Conceptions based on a critique of  culture regard transparency as 
an expression of  misguided scientific ideas allied with dangerous 
social developments (4.2).
4.1 Transparency as subjective knowledge
Without using the term “transparency” in the sense of  the 
idea of  a world that is transparent for human beings, Descartes’ 
epistemology contains some features that coincide with the con-
cept of  scientific-epistemic transparency. In Descartes, clarity and 
distinctness serve as criteria of  truth that guarantee knowledge of  
the world. But nothing is as clear and distinct as one’s own think-
ing.35 Since the claimed unsurpassable transparency and absolute 
immunity to error of  one’s own thought can only be experienced 
introspectively by a single subject, it is only suitable in a qualified 
sense as a candidate for objectivity (as implied by the concept of  
transparency advocated here).
Descartes accords the explanations of  empirical phenom-
ena merely a hypothetical character. Assuming that the clear and 
distinct truth of  thought provides the yardstick, the explanation 
of  the world of  experience achieves only a diminished level of  
transparency.36 However, the hypothetical element of  the scientific 
representation of  reality does not necessarily have any enduring 
validity. There are reasons to believe that Descartes assumed that 
the hypotheses for explaining the external world could be replaced 
by true, intersubjectively verifiable and hence objective statements 
as research progressed.37
35 René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections From the 
Objections and Replies, ed. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 16 ff.
36 The epitome of  non-transparency is the obviously existing interaction 
between thinking and the extended world. As Margaret Dauler Wilson correct-
ly points out, Descartes’ explanations of  these relationships between body and 
soul are replaced by the “rather obscure and difficult to interpret” expression 
“nature teaches me that” (“natura docet”) (Margaret Dauler Wilson, Descartes 
[London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978], 209).
37 Gregor Schiemann, “Descartes’ Hypothesenbegriff im ‘Discours de 
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In contrast to Descartes (and Aristotle), Rousseau’s contri-
bution to the philosophy of  science resides in critique rather than 
justification. He criticizes the claim to truth and the general valid-
ity of  scientific knowledge. The sciences owe their emergence to 
human vices, according to Rousseau; with their findings they also 
conceal truths and they represent a social danger.38 
Like Descartes, Rousseau is committed to the ideal of  a 
purely subjective knowledge that satisfies the requirements of  uni-
versally accessible objectivity only in a limited sense. But, in con-
trast to Descartes, he does not regard his own rationally constituted 
thinking, but instead the “inner voice of  nature,” which expresses 
itself  in everyday practice as individual conscience, as the epitome 
of  truth.39 Inner nature has not been destroyed in the course of  
the process of  civilization, but its effectiveness has been changed 
by human action. The conscience that is inherent in every human 
being contains the residua of  a nature that has not been deformed 
by culture. With this Rousseau affirms a power of  judgment that is 
independent of  scientific knowledge and is able to make contribu-
tions on the topic of  nature in public space. In this context, “trans-
parency” becomes the guiding principle for an orientation to the 
fiction of  an as yet unobstructed access to the world.40
This meaning of  epistemic and public transparency as im-
mediate intelligibility is not part of  the concept defended here in-
sofar as it is restricted to the scientific knowledge of  the world. The 
theoretically mediated character of  the explanations and processes 
of  understanding typical of  this knowledge contradicts the Rous-
seauian concept. However, Rousseau rightly points to the spaces 
of  experience that are still founded on the naturalness of  human 
life. I understand the lifeworld, which in its structure of  perception 
and action takes up elements of  the immediacy described by Rous-
la methode’ und in den ‘Principia philosophiae’,” in XVII. Deutscher Kongreß für 
Philosophie Leipzig 23.–27. September 1996, Kongreßband: Vorträge und Kolloquien, eds. 
Christoph Hubig and Hans Poser (Leipzig: Institut für Philosophie, 1996).
38 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and The Discourses, trans. 
George Douglas Howard Cole (New York: Souvereign, 2016), 83.
39 Rousseau, Contract, 87.
40 Starobinski, Rousseau.
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seau, as one type of  this experience.
4.2 Transparency as an object of  cultural criticism 
I understand “cultural criticism” in a broad sense. Its ob-
ject is the critical assessment of  cultural phenomena, where—fol-
lowing its predominantly pejorative meaning in actual usage—I 
limit myself  to the disapproval of  transparency as a cultural phe-
nomenon in philosophical discourse.41 In this discourse, the term 
transparency is used to refer to both epistemic and public forms, 
without a sharp distinction being made between these applica-
tions. In substance, the selected authors thematize the phenom-
enon of  transparency they criticize as part of  a process of  dis-
enchantment, albeit without reference to Weber. The concept of  
transparency proposed here is distinguished from cultural criticism 
by its descriptive character, which coheres with Weber’s universal-
ist understanding of  disenchantment.42 Although Weber takes a 
negative view of  the cultural nihilism concerning the meaning of  
disenchantment, he describes it as a factual process that is beyond 
human control.
Manfred Schneider considers modernity’s “dream of  trans-
parency” to be an omnipresent, but unrealizable and therefore all 
the more dangerous project that was formulated in programmatic 
terms by Descartes and Rousseau.43 Schneider defines transpar-
ency so narrowly that it is in fact impossible to realize. Follow-
ing Descartes and Rousseau, he defines it as knowledge that has 
immediate and unquestionable access to its object.44 But scientific 
knowledge, to which my concept of  scientific-epistemic transpar-
41 The concept of  culture refers to identity-forming and unifying 
achievements of  localized communities, where the achievements in question 
transcend the natural conditions of  life of  these communities by forming tradi-
tions.
42 See footnote 10.
43 Manfred Schneider, Transparenztraum: Literatur, Politik, Medien und das 
Unmögliche (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2013).
44 Schneider, Transparenztraum, 11–16.
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ency refers, is not based on self-evidence, but on experience, which 
is for the most part acquired by technical means, and on the theo-
retical reconstruction and prediction of  data.
For Byung-Chul Han, the discursive dominance of  the catch-
word “transparency” demonstrates that “the moral foundation 
of  society has become brittle.”45 The “transparency society” does 
not rely on trust, but on control. The crazy attempt to implement 
the idea of  transparency completely (whose exemplary expression 
he finds in Rousseau) leads, according to Han, “necessarily ... to 
tyranny,”46 since a human life without areas of  obscurity is not 
possible. Han polemically highlights how transparency destroys 
meaning. Only machines and emptiness, he argues, are completely 
transparent.47 In keeping with the theme of  social criticism, he 
is primarily concerned with public transparency, which, in con-
trast to epistemic transparency, actually requires social limitation, 
as I will explain below. As an antidote to the threat of  the domi-
nance of  transparency, Han recommends Nietzschean “pathos of  
distance.”48
Both Jean Baudrillard and Gianni Vattimo discuss the epis-
temic and public aspects of  transparency but, for opposite reasons, 
do not accord central importance to resistance to the social influ-
ence of  transparency. For Baudrillard, the complete transparency 
of  all conditions and processes is the characteristic expression of  
the supremacy of  nihilism, which he attributes to the advanced 
scientific representation and technical controllability of  the world. 
After disenchantment had destroyed the world of  appearances in 
the nineteenth century, he argues, meaning was annihilated by the 
transparency that leads to “indifference and lack of  conviction.”49 
45 Byung-Chul Han, The Transparency Society, trans. Erik Butler (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 48 (translation amended).
46 Han, Transparency Society, 44.
47 Han, Transparency Society, 3 and 40.
48 Han, Transparency Society, 4.
49 Jean Baudrillard, “Transparenz,” in Probleme des Nihilismus: Dokumente 
der Triester Konferenz 1980 (Berliner Hefte 17), eds. Volker Braunbehrens et al. 
(Berlin: Verlag Kantstraße, 1981), 30 ff. On the nihilistic character of  trans-
parency in Baudrillard, see Gregor Schiemann, “Nihilismus der Transparenz: 
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Although Baudrillard’s description of  the transparent society at 
times reads like that of  a hopeless catastrophe, his work also con-
tains calls for resistance. Thus he pleads for a return to the phe-
nomena: “I believe in the immortality of  appearances and that 
they are immune to the nihilism of  meaning and nonsense.”50
While Baudrillard’s description of  transparency is in part 
accurate but grossly exaggerates its importance, Vattimo underesti-
mates transparency. Vattimo agrees with Baudrillard that transpar-
ency follows the model of  scientific objectivity, but claims that the 
influence of  this model is dwindling and that it is itself  undergoing 
a crisis.51 The plurality of  the real conditions and of  the possible 
conceptions of  reality, not just those geared to scientific objectivity, 
is rendering the world less transparent. According to Vattimo, the 
scientific knowledge that aims at transparency is not able to grasp 
the world in its diversity. Opacity is not only a hallmark of  real-
ity and the ways of  understanding it, but corresponds to human 
needs. 
The negative evaluations of  transparency in the critique of  
culture remind us that scientific objectivity, which claims that its 
subject matter are phenomena that transcend cultures and epochs, 
is also a culturally dependent and historical phenomenon that is 
subject to change and can be made to disappear. However, the 
striving for transparency that reaches as far back as antiquity has 
established and proven itself  as a distinguishing feature of  scien-
tific objectivity, so that there are reasons to assume that this con-
nection will remain in place for the time being. 
5. Limits of  scientific-epistemic transparency and of  ni-
hilism concerning meaning
In scientism, epistemic transparency follows the idea that 
Grenzen der Medienphilosophie Jean Baudrillards,” in Paradoxalität des Medi-
alen, eds. Jan-Henrik Möller, Jörg Sternagel and Lenore Hipper (Paderborn: 
Wilhelm Fink, 2013).
50 Baudrillard, “Transparenz,” 37.
51 Gianni Vattimo, The Transparent Society, trans. David Webb (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 8.
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all phenomena in the world can be grasped by science. It assumes 
that there are no methodological limits to science, only those set 
by its perhaps finite set of  objects. For the present, we can only 
speculate about possible limits to transparency. The observable 
universe is spatially limited; moreover, its accelerated expansion 
will in the distant future limit the scope of  the objects that can be 
experienced.52 It will probably continue to be possible to study the 
domain of  the very small on earth only if  we succeed in making 
particles collide with much higher energies than those employed 
up to now. But it may not be practically feasible to produce the 
required energies. Furthermore, we cannot rule out that causal 
connections, which are indispensable for several explanations, will 
run up against a limit in irreducibly chance occurrences, such as 
are already asserted today for the world of  the very small. From a 
causal perspective, chance necessarily remains opaque. 
Today scientific explanation and understanding are always 
restricted insofar as they are conducted with reference to specif-
ic fields or layers of  reality.53 Thus, for example, we distinguish 
between physical, chemical and biological explanations, each of  
which draws upon specific concepts and rules. The difference be-
tween explaining objects of  the material world and understanding 
objects with meanings can also be understood as a product of  the 
differentiation and autonomization of  scientific knowledge. Con-
temporary scientific knowledge is fragmented and often does not 
even allow experts from neighboring disciplines to communicate 
with each other about their research.
Under these conditions, lack of  transparency arises where 
phenomena simultaneously fall within the object domain of  differ-
ent concepts and rules. Examples of  this are transitional phenom-
ena between atomic and chemical, chemical and biological, and 
52 Gregor Schiemann, “The Coming Emptiness: On the Meaning of  
the Emptiness of  the Universe in Natural Philosophy,” Philosophies 4.1 (March 
2019), https://doi.org/10.3390/philosophies4010001.
53 On the conception of  world as comprising levels of  reality, see 
Gregor Schiemann, “Levels of  the World: Limits and Extensions of  Nicolai 
Hartmann’s and Werner Heisenberg’s Conceptions of  Levels,” Horizon: Studies 
in Phenomenology, 8.1 (2019): 103-122. 
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biological and mental objects. In other words, it is not yet possible 
to represent the relationships between the concepts and rules of  
the object domains of  physics, chemistry, biology and psychology 
in a transparent way. Even more problematic is the relationship 
between scientific explanation and understanding. Can phenom-
ena of  meaning be explained by material processes? Can the ex-
planation of  material processes dispense with the understanding 
of  meaning? 
In the past, progress in explanation and understanding 
was not only achieved through differentiation, but conversely 
also by merging areas of  knowledge. In physics, different effects 
of  forces were represented by unified laws, chemical processes 
were explained in physical terms, and so forth. Furthermore, cer-
tain variants of  scientism strive to unify all scientific knowledge 
by explaining all phenomena as objects of  a single comprehen-
sive theory. If  this were successful, it might not just involve the 
elimination of  ambiguities between different concepts and laws. 
In their unified description, scientific knowledge, assuming that it 
was generally intelligible, and the production of  cultural mean-
ing might once again come closer together. To the extent that the 
separation between objectivity and subjectivity or between facts 
and norms would be overcome, science might develop norm-set-
ting and hence meaning-endowing dimensions. In that case, which 
is admittedly quite unlikely, the nihilism of  transparent knowledge 
would at least be relativized, if  not completely obviated. 
6. Limits of  public transparency
Transparency is a ubiquitous catchword, less so because of  
its epistemic importance for science than because of  its relevance 
in public debates. Whereas in the foregoing discussion public trans-
parency served primarily to better define epistemic transparency, 
here I would like to contrast the non-self-limiting character of  
epistemic transparency with the need to set limits to public trans-
parency. Where scientific knowledge acquires public relevance, it is 
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also exposed to the demands for public transparency.
With regard to the requirement that information should 
be generally available and the need to place limits on it, a rough 
distinction must be made between two kinds of  cases. On the one 
hand, the requirement is addressed to social institutions and actors 
to disclose the relevant information underlying their procedures, 
decisions and actions. In order to facilitate public judgments, po-
litical, economic and legal processes should be rendered intelligible 
in this sense. Fulfilling this requirement is not always unproblem-
atic, since determining the criteria of  relevance is often beset with 
ambiguity, the disclosure of  information can hinder the organi-
zation of  social processes and it can also be politically, legally or 
morally questionable. Therefore, procedures are required to set 
limiting regulations.
On the other hand, social institutions also call conversely 
for the creation of  transparency in public and private space. For 
example, public spaces are monitored or people’s private data are 
recorded for security purposes. Since control over not generally 
accessible information is constitutive of  the private sphere, this 
transparency requirement is also not uncontroversial. It calls for 
a complex counterbalancing of  the social good of  security against 
the individual good of  privacy. In order to protect the private do-
main, limits must be placed on public transparency.
Every restriction of  public transparency—be it in order to 
protect social institutions and their actors or to protect the private 
sphere—is also a restriction of  the disenchantment generated by 
scientific-epistemic transparency. What is not generally accessible 
is also not accessible to the scientific comprehension of  the world 
and, as long as human beings have control over it, it is not gener-
ally transparent.
7. Conclusion
A world that had been completely explained and under-
stood would be epistemically transparent. All obscurity with re-
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gard to phenomena would have been eliminated in this world and 
scientific knowledge would be no longer be subject to any hin-
drances or limits. From all that we know today, such a world will 
probably never exist. But the scope and transparency of  knowl-
edge are increasing over time and in future they could achieve such 
a degree of  completion that there would be no room for significant 
improvement.
In the modern world, transparency is primarily created by 
scientific knowledge on a global scale. Not only is it not essentially 
dependent on cultural meaning, but until now it has also elimi-
nated existing cultural meanings without replacing them with al-
ternatives. Cultural meaning contains comprehensive systems of  
relevance and practical orientations such as were traditionally of-
fered by religions. The inability of  science to create comprehensive 
meaning is currently a function of  its differentiated and autono-
mous character.
The transparency generated by science stands in the tradi-
tion of  disenchantment (Entzauberung) as described by Max Weber. 
Weber uses the term “enchantment” or “magic” (Zauber) in its nar-
row sense to refer to the recognition of  not rationally demonstrated 
claims and non-sensually experienceable realities that nevertheless 
have relevance for action. However, the successful historical recep-
tion of  the concept of  disenchantment can be traced back to the 
broad meaning of  “enchantment” or “magic.” Disenchantment 
then means that the phenomenal world loses its fascination and 
unquestionable relevance for human beings.
In modernity, disenchantment increasingly assumes the 
form of  the creation of  scientific-epistemic transparency. The 
world that science recognizes, and which is in this respect trans-
parent for it, is not only one devoid of  comprehensive meaning, 
but also one whose details have lost their enigmatic character and 
their mysterious radiance (section 1). If  science were to succeed in 
overcoming the specialized character of  its knowledge and sub-
suming it into a uniform and generally comprehensible system, it 
could develop a meaning-generating force within its limited scope, 
although this can hardly be expected (section 5). 
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In order to understand scientific-epistemic transparency 
as advanced disenchantment, some conceptual work needs to be 
done and this is a task for philosophy. On the one hand, Weber’s 
concept of  disenchantment is in need of  correction. It must be 
conceived more narrowly through a more precise reference to the 
sciences, which means that it must be demarcated from non-sci-
entific forms of  transparency, such as are primarily found in the 
lifeworld (section 2). At the same time, however, it must also be 
expanded by incorporating the value-laden character of  scientific 
knowledge rejected by Weber (section 3). On the other hand, the 
concept of  scientific-epistemic transparency must be clearly distin-
guished from other conceptions of  transparency. Scientific-epis-
temic transparency must not be conceived as essentially a result 
of  subjective cognitive processes and its objectivity must not be 
disputed (section 4). Finally, epistemic transparency must be con-
trasted with the public transparency that is at the forefront of  the 
current discourse (section 6).
The process of  disenchantment has already reached an ad-
vanced stage due to the dominance of  its transparent form. An 
excellent way of  characterizing this condition is through Weber’s 
observation that the extent of  the scientific knowledge achieved so 
far justifies the general assumption that in principle nothing expe-
rienceable can elude it. Even if  the world is still far from having 
reached the presumed limits of  its transparency, hardly anyone in 
science doubts that we could make it transparent to a large extent 
“if  we wished to” (Weber). The taken-for-grantedness with which 
the possible transparency of  the world is already assumed and ac-
cepted is, however, itself  a feature of  transparency.
